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This book is not quite what I was expecting. I admit that
my main reason for wanting to read it—and perhaps, in hindsight, not an especially good reason—was the intriguing pairing of terms found in the title. Was I wrong to have expected
Philosophy & Animal Life to contain philosophical arguments
about animals? My simplistic assumptions about its contents
were challenged from the get go, as I found that this volume
is actually a series of dialogical essays on the general theme of
what our lived experiences—and, indeed, the experiences of
fictional literary characters—can teach us, as humans, about the
reality and meaning of animal. In keeping with the length and
tone of the book, I will keep this review short.
A source much discussed by each author represented here
is J. M. Coetzee’s novel The Lives of Animals, with special attention paid to Coetzee’s character Elizabeth Costello, a novelist giving a series of lectures at a college. Costello is severely
troubled by the ways humans routinely treat other animals;
however, she seems unable to adequately convey her sense of
this troubling through language, and especially through conventional philosophical argumentation. Diamond takes Costello to exemplify a “difficulty of reality” that cannot be captured
by the practices of philosophical discourse, which is thought
to deflect (rather than, I suppose, facilitate the absorption of)
this reality. What we have here is what philosophers might call
a problem: Philosophy appears for many, in virtue of its very
methodology, to be failing not only at the task of enabling a full
understanding of an important aspect of human existence—of
helping us stay “turned … towards the life of the animals we
are,” as Diamond puts it (77)—but also both at the realization
of its purported potential as an avenue for apprehending what
our current mode of existence means for other kinds of sentient
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beings, and as a guide to the ways in which we might respond
to such a realization.
One possible, partial remedy for this is to take a more literary or poetic approach to conveying these difficulties. Perhaps
a different style of communication, one that elicits more feelings, will do the trick, or at least help us do it. This approach is
suggested, for me, by both the writing styles and stated views
of some of the authors of Philosophy & Animal Life (namely,
Wolfe, Diamond, and Cavell). Hacking, interestingly, suggests
that the human ability to deflect reality may not be such a bad
thing (for us, it might be replied). If we have evolved the ability
to insulate or shield ourselves from some potentially painful realities by translating them into the language of philosophy, why
not avail ourselves of this ability? My preferred answer, ironically, could have philosophical origins: Because this practice
may not always lead us as near to truth about existence as we
would hope to get. While Philosophy & Animal Life is not quite
what I expected, I greatly enjoyed this treatment of how attending to (i.e. not deflecting from) embodiment can help humans
both cultivate empathy and, perhaps, come to a settlement with
skepticism about what is “out there.”
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